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The theory of trade and capital market liberalization has been floated around in
discussions about economic stability and development for decades. Due to the fact that the
world is becoming more and more interdependent and interconnected each and every day, the
necessity for a global market emerged in the early 1990’s. The Western response to
globalization in many cases was dubbed the “Washington Consensus,” of which trade
liberalization is a huge part. The idea of trade liberalization is centralized in the idea of a freemarket economy, originally posited by Adam Smith. His model proposed the idea of the
“invisible hand”, the idea that the market would regulate itself and would not need
government interference in order to do so; this led to many of the ideas discussed in the
concept of trade liberalization. By opening markets and removing or at least reducing trade
barriers with countries around the world, the hope was that economies would thrive. This
theory of aggressive trade liberalization, however, has numerous flaws which must be taken
into consideration before applying the policies to developing nations. While the Washington
Consensus policies of trade liberalization may work for some countries, it has effectively
crippled numerous others, due to its inability to take into account numerous other factors
within a country. As economic and political history has shown, the idea of aggressive policies of
trade liberalization is not always the smartest option to pursue, while a greater focus on the
inner development of a country and slow liberalization may be the true keys to economic
success in developing countries. Discussions about such policies of trade liberalization were
brought about through a concerted realization of the need for a global economic structure and
stability following one of the most devastating wars in recent memory.

Hanshaw

3

In July of 1944, after the conclusion of World War II, approximately 730 members from
44 different nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to discuss the prospects of global
financial development.1 This has since been known as the Bretton Woods Conference, and
established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which was later absorbed by the World Bank. Both of
these organizations were created in order to rebuild economies which were devastated by the
pains of war, and to provide financial stability within the international community. Up until
recently, the IMF focused solely on policies involving inflation. However, recent trends have
increased their awareness of further global issues, and interest has now shifted to poverty
reduction as a whole. Joseph Stiglitz describes this trend in his book Making Globalization Work,
in which he writes, “Until recently, IMF perspectives have been paramount in economic policy
discussions, and the IMF traditionally focused on inflation rather than on wages,
unemployment, or poverty. Its view was that poverty reduction was the mandate of the World
Bank, while its own mandate was global economic stability. But focusing on inflation and
ignoring employment led to the obvious result: higher unemployment and more poverty. The
good news is that, at least officially, the IMF has now made poverty reduction a priority.”2 With
the creation of the IMF and parts of the World Bank, the Bretton Woods Conference has
allowed us to work toward greater partnership within the global economic community, which
led to the very fabric of the Washington Consensus and its policies of trade liberalization.

1

th
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What exactly is the Washington Consensus? The Washington Consensus is a collective
policy decision on how to allow for developing countries to enter into the global economic
market. As Phillip Arestis writes in his article “Washington Consensus and Financial
Liberalization,” the Washington Consensus is actually composed of ten specific measures to
ensure economic stability and growth. He writes, “The Washington Consensus (or the "ten
commandments") is actually very specific in its policy approach: Williamson (2002; see also
1990, 2004-5, this issue) summarizes it as follows: (1) fiscal discipline, (2) re-ordering public
expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) liberalizing interest rate, (5) liberalization of inward
foreign direct investment, (6) trade liberalization, (7) a competitive exchange rate trade, (8)
privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) property rights.”3 Each of these policies has its own
importance, but the one which must garner the most attention is the sixth point, trade
liberalization. Trade Liberalization is an extremely important measure to accept once a nation is
stable, but during the process of development, may not be the best option.
Trade liberalization has been at the forefront of globalization and economic growth for a
very long time. The idea of free-market economics has been around since Adam Smith’s
publication, and even before that. The concept of trade liberalization takes the idea that when
all of the restrictive forces within an economy are neutralized, it will in turn correct itself, either
fixing or creating a new economic structure. As Stiglitz writes in his book, however, the concept
of trade liberalization is one of great controversy. He writes, “Trade liberalization – opening up
markets to the free flow of goods and services – was supposed to lead to growth. The evidence

3
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is at best mixed. Part of the reason that international trade agreements have been so
unsuccessful in promoting growth in poor countries is that they were often unbalanced: the
advanced industrial countries were allowed to levy tariffs on goods produced by developing
countries that were, on average, four times higher than those on goods produced by other
advanced industrial countries.”4 Trade liberalization is a concept which can quite easily be
manipulated by developed nations in order to give them an edge over the still developing
countries. Numerous different problems have surfaced with trade liberalization which show
that rational self interest always prevails in foreign relations. Although developed countries
convey to the global community their willingness to work with developing nations, what goes
on behind the scenes is quite another story, and is really a case of simple leverage.
The idea of leverage within trade liberalization policies has been studied at length, as
the developed countries use their wealth and power to make sure that they are getting the best
deal in terms of what they receive from countries they trade with. This has been shown time
and time again in the case of so-called “dumping laws” where firms which are producing goods
at a lower cost than those within the United States are accused of dumping their products
when, in reality, they simply have a lower cost of operation. In this sense, each of the
developing countries which enters into trade agreements with those countries with lesser
stature seeks their own rational self-interest, even if it is damaging to the other countries. In a
study of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Jen Baggs and James A. Brander
discuss the importance of trade liberalization and leverage within such an agreement. They
write, “We draw attention to the idea that changes in trade policy might induce a change in the
4
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appropriate financial structure in the firm. However, it is likely that many managers do not
react effectively to such changes. Even among those who do react, many managers are 'forced
into' changing leverage by default as profits fall or rise rather than by anticipating the effects
and acting accordingly. It is quite possible that firms would do better by intentionally changing
leverage at an early stage.”5 This is an extremely important distinction which must be made in
terms of trade when discussing the idea of trade liberalization. Mutual benefits are a must, and
those countries who are being victimized by unfair regulations or sanctions put forth by the
developing country must be able to establish some sort of financial leverage before entering
into the global economic arena. Without comprehensive financial responsibility from developed
countries, it is highly unlikely that those developing countries will benefit from instantaneous
liberalization, as it will only serve to crumble their economies.
An extremely pertinent aspect of trade liberalization is the speed at which it occurs.
Advocates of immediate and aggressive trade liberalization are said to be proponents of what is
known as “shock therapy.” Shock therapy supposes that the only way for a developing country
to build its economy is to be thrown into the global financial market through reform, trade
agreements, and reduction of tariffs. This has been shown in many cases, however, to be an
extremely dangerous and sometimes foolish plan. Shock therapy operates under the
assumption that each individual country which enters into the global economy will be on the
same relative playing field. This, however, is very much not the case, as has been shown in
many historical cases, such as Russia and many Latin American countries.
5
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Joseph Stiglitz discusses the problems which were brought about as a result of the
Washington Consensus policies in both Russia, and numerous countries of Latin America.
Concerning Latin America, Stiglitz is extremely disheartened in the way which adoption of such
policies crippled their economy. He writes, “Meanwhile, Latin America embraced the
Washington Consensus more wholeheartedly than any other region (indeed, the term was first
coined with reference to policies advocated for that region). Together, the failures of Latin
America and the successes of East Asia provide the strongest case against the Washington
Consensus.”6 Latin American countries had been experiencing relative economic success prior
to the adoption of Washington Consensus policies, but were forced to do so because of the
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Stiglitz discusses the idea that as high inflation broke
out as a result of the debt crisis, the Washington Consensus policies simply made sense to
adopt in the Latin American countries. However, the growth which came from these policies
was not sustainable at all. They saw a large consumption boom, followed immediately by
recession and stagnation, which created a greater gap between the very poor and the very rich.
Stiglitz writes, “At this writing, it is fair to say that there is widespread disillusionment in Latin
America with the Washington Consensus: a growing consensus against the Washington
Consensus reflected in the election of leftist governments in Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia.” 6
The turmoil in Latin American countries due to the Washington Consensus provides one of the
strongest arguments against implementation of such policies. The inability to craft specific
policies for the economic development and recovery for each country or group of countries
individually is seen as a major flaw in the system of Washington Consensus policymaking.
6
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In the case of Russia, the underestimation of precisely how much damage policies of
trade liberalization and financial liberalization could do led to tough economic times for the
country. With Russia, and similar nations in transition from communism, the belief was that socalled “shock therapy” would be able to stabilize the nations by quickly converting them to
capitalism. Stiglitz writes of this subject, saying “After the Berlin Wall fell, there was hope of
democracy and economic prosperity throughout the former Soviet Union and its satellite
states. Advisers from the West rushed to Eastern Europe to guide those countries through their
transitions. Many believed, mistakenly, that ‘shock therapy’ was needed – that the transition to
Western-style capitalism should take place overnight through rapid privatization and
liberalization. Instantaneous price liberalization brought with it – predictably – hyperinflation.”7
Stiglitz notes that because of this hyperinflation, at one point, prices of goods in Ukraine
increased at a rate of approximately 3,300% per year.
Along with the economic mess which was occurring within the countries in transition
from communism, there was also widespread corruption within each of the governments, as
the wealthy rulers sought to accumulate all of the money which was being funneled into the
countries which was designated for assistance by the IMF. The problematic assumption which
the IMF and other financial organizations made was that they believed that this money would
be used for reconstruction and assistance for those in need. They trusted in the honor and
leadership of those who were in power, when they should have realized the demonizing effect
which money and power have on individuals. Stiglitz puts this phenomenon best when he
writes, “Capital markets were liberalized in the mistaken belief that money would be induced to
7
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come in. Instead, there was a massive capital flight, including the famous purchase of the
Chelsea football club and numerous country estates in the U.K. by one of the oligarchs, Roman
Abramovich. Ordinary Russians, naturally, found it hard to see how this helped Russia’s growth.
It was as if the advisers believed that opening a birdcage would encourage birds to fly into the
cage, rather than encouraging the birds in the cage to fly out.”8 This was an extremely
problematic assumption, as trade liberalization and shock therapy only worked to empower the
governments of former Soviet countries, allowing them to horde all of the money which was
supposed to be coming into the country purposed for relief efforts. The rapid privatization and
liberalization which was pushed, coupled with the lack of accountability from the organizations
lending the money, led to fantastic living for Russian oligarchs, but terrible conditions for the
economic situation and citizens of Russia. Luckily, as Stiglitz admits, experts now widely agree
that the speed at which such privatization and liberalization reforms were made within the
Soviet bloc countries was a grave miscalculation, and that sound regulations and strong tax
laws must take precedence over liberalization.
In Russia particularly, this compounding problem of lack of institutional strength and
quick liberalization was extremely evident. As Stiglitz writes, “The rapid and corrupt
privatizations in Russia set in motion a vicious circle. The meager amounts received by the
government led to questioning the legitimacy of the transfer of public resources to the private
sector. Investors - those who had acquired the assets – then felt, quite rightly, that their
property rights were not secure, that a new government might, under popular pressure,
reverse privatization. As a result, they limited their investment and took as much of their profits
8
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out of the country as they could – leading to further disillusionment with the privatization
process, making property rights still less secure.” 8 This is an extremely evident consequence of
the lack of trust in the financial stability of a developing market economy completely destroying
the prospects of growth and development, both at a foreign and domestic level.
In addition to Latin American countries and countries in transition, African nations were
also adversely affected by the adoption of Washington Consensus policies. Stiglitz writes in his
book, of these countries, “They were provided with assistance – typically loans rather than
grants – accompanied by conditions designed to assist their ‘structural adjustment.’ Too often,
though, the conditions were misguided, the projects for which the money was lent
misconceived. The borrowing countries were required to adapt the structure of their economy
to the IMF’s market fundamentalism, to Washington Consensus policies. Liberalization opened
up African markets to goods from foreign countries, but the African countries had little to sell
abroad… Not surprisingly, the policies failed to bring growth. But the burden of debt
remained.”8 This is yet another blow to the Washington Consensus policies of aggressive trade
liberalization within economies that are simply not ready to discuss the macroeconomic actions
in the future, as they still need to focus on the microeconomic actions to take presently. The
ideas of shock therapy and aggressive trade liberalization simply do not take into account the
previous conditions of these economies. In order for a country to be considered viable in a
world economic system, it must have a solid economic base within its own borders, coupled
with stable financial institutions which will be able to lead them into such a forum. Without
both of these ideas in place, there is no way that an economy can be shoved into the global
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arena and be expected to compete with countries which have a massive leg up on them. A
slower transition, however, would allow these countries to build their economies at home, and
set up these financial institutions so that when they are ready to face the global economic
market, they will be able to do so with some leverage.
Stiglitz makes an extremely important point about trade liberalization and shock therapy
when he writes, “Some countries, like Poland and Slovenia, managed the transition better,
partly because they did not embrace shock therapy as strongly. The countries of Eastern Europe
as a whole did well largely, I think, because of the prospect of joining the EU. It forced them to
adopt quickly a sound legal framework, and that reassured investors.” 8 This is the crux of the
argument which will now be made within this paper. Policies of trade liberalization and shock
therapy must be evaluated, and shock therapy must be replaced with a policy which allows for
much slower and gradual transition of a state into the global economy, so that a country is able
to create a solid foundation which will be able to support it when it is brought into global
competition. There have been too many instances of countries being rushed into an economic
transition ending in failure to think that the Latin American countries and formerly Soviet
countries are misnomers. It must be noted that those developing countries which follow the
route of a much more gradual and slower-paced shock therapy are the ones which reach the
actualization of a stable economy and gain the ability to compete on a global level.
While the countries of Latin America and countries which were in transition from
communism to capitalism show the strongest case against the Washington Consensus’ use of
shock therapy and aggressive trade liberalization, countries such as China and India provide a
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solid framework for the type of trade liberalization policies which should be considered for
developing nations. In his book, Joseph Stiglitz once again considers the policies of trade
liberalization and shock therapy, but as they apply to China, when he writes, “The Soviet bloc
countries were not the only ones transitioning from communism. China and Vietnam, while
retaining a Communist political regime, also began to move to a market economy, and the
contrast was striking. As incomes in Russia plummeted – falling by a third from 1990 to 2000 –
incomes in those countries soared, increasing by 135 percent in China and 75 percent in
Vietnam. They rejected Shock therapy in favor of a slower and more gentle transition to a
market economy. Today the vibrancy of their economies suggests that the tortoise has
outpaced the hare.”9 China provides one of the most important examples of how shock therapy
and trade liberalization policies should be adopted by developing countries and economies. The
pattern seems to hold for each and every country which experiences the process of trade
liberalization – if it is a process of aggressive and fast sanctions, then the country will not fare
nearly as well as the one which allows its domestic economy to build to the point which they
are ready to compete when they are thrust into the global economy. By spending the time to
hone the infrastructure within its country, China was able to take doses of shock therapy at its
own pace, an experiment which has paid off, and which more and more countries will try to
replicate. Stiglitz would agree with this assessment, as he sees the development of the Asian
countries as a model which developing countries should seek to follow. He writes, “Today,
developing countries around the world are looking to Asia, to the examples of success, to see
what they can learn. It is not surprising that global support for the Washington Consensus has
9
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waned. Its failures can be seen around the world, in Africa, Latin America, and the countries in
transition. The clearest test was in the transition from communism to a market economy; those
that followed the Washington Consensus failed, almost to a country.” 10
The success of China specifically provides a monumental boost to proponents of a
slower paced form of trade liberalization, rather than the shock therapy policies of aggressive
trade liberalization. In their article, “Market Liberalization and Firm Performance during China's
Economic Transition,” Seung Ho Park, Shaomin Li and David K. Tse discuss the effect to which
China’s slower paced trade liberalization led to success within their current economic
transition. They begin by noting, as previously mentioned, that China took a relatively
unconventional route to trade liberalization, refuting Washington Consensus policies of
aggressive trade liberalization and shock therapy in favor of a more incremental increase, a
slower form of shock therapy. They write, “China has followed a different path toward
economic development from Western and other Asian countries that made a rapid transition
from a hierarchical to a market system. China has pursued an incremental transformation by
decentralizing government control and allowing a variety of property rights through continuous
negotiation among central, regional, and private interests.”11 Through this method of slow
trade liberalization backed by strong institutional control, China was able to mold different
aspects of the Washington Consensus into its very own distinct type of financial liberalization.
They then used this newfound increase in wealth allowed them to then liberalize their

10
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own market back home, allowing for increased productivity and firm performance. Park, Li and
Tse write of this phenomenon, “Empirical findings support the contention that the market
liberalization in China has had a significant effect on firm performance through various
institutional changes, primarily the decentralization of control to local governments and firms,
ownership restructuring, and industrial policies.”11 By realizing that shock therapy and
aggressive Washington Consensus policies of trade liberalization created growth which was
unsustainable, China was able to provide a model of precisely what action should be taken by a
country which hopes to work its way up to be a significant contributor to the global economy.
Through a slowly paced trade liberalization regime, and strong institutional foundations within
the country, they managed to create the perfect recipe for success in trade liberalization. These
policy decisions should be revered as the precise measures which a developing country hoping
to be competitive economically should take in order to start along the path.
China and India provide the strongest arguments as to what parts of the Washington
Consensus actually work, and what parts are in need of tweaking. In terms of trade
liberalization, shock therapy can never be the answer unless the economy is fully functional on
its own, and there are institutions set within the country to ensure that entrance into the global
economic sector goes smoothly. For many developing countries, these factors are all but a
twinkle in the eyes of the leaders, and must face globalization and trade liberalization as China
did, making sure to allow for an extremely slow transition into the global economy, rather than
trying to privatize the assets of a country in one fell swoop. Shock therapy is a policy which is
constantly on the defensive, as numerous historical examples have shown that such a quick
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transition just does not work. Numerous studies and discussions have been centered on the
idea that no one-size-fits-all approach can possibly capture the complexity of a transition
economy, and that each economic transition must have its own individualized path to success.
Park, Li and Tse describe this very phenomenon in their article, as they write, “. As scholars of
transition economies have argued, economic transitions are path-dependent, and thus each
post-communist experience is unique.”11 This is an extremely important observation to be
made, and serves the argument that Washington Consensus policies of broadly-based reforms
should not be the norm for trade liberalization in developing nations.
Strong financial institutions are immeasurably important to the success of developing
countries, and are a necessary prerequisite for entrance into the global economic state. By
capitalizing on this slow trade liberalization, rather than focusing on “shock therapy” policies,
developing countries will be given time to foster those prerequisites, in order to ensure that
they are ready to compete on a global scale. Within their article “Financial Liberalization and
Stability of the Financial System in Emerging Markets: The Institutional Dimension of Financial
Crises, J.P. Allegret, B. Courbis and Phillip Dulbecco discuss the importance of strong financial
institutions within a country, and the idea that these financial institutions must provide the very
foundation for a country which hopes to adopt policies of trade liberalization. They write, “The
analysis developed by McKinnon and Pill therefore leads us to question the role of institutional
factors in banking crises. More precisely, the Washington Consensus which makes economic
liberalization the necessary and sufficient condition of world growth, seems inadequate
because the liberalization process underlies this consensus underestimates the need to invest
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in the institutional infrastructure before introducing financial reforms.”12 This idea of
institutional control is integral to the development of a nation which hopes to actively
participate in a global economic structure. Without strong leaders and regulations, much like
the case of countries in transition from communism discussed earlier, a country which will
enter into the global market will be extremely unstable, and simply unable to compete.
Without a strong macroeconomic stability, a country will be wholly unprepared to enter into
the global economy, which hints at the idea that a strong economy within one’s borders is a
natural prerequisite for policies of trade liberalization.
Matias Braun and Claudio Raddatz also discuss this concept of financial institutions in
their article, “The Politics of Financial Development: Evidence from Trade Liberalization.” They
write, “We find that those countries where trade liberalization results in an increase in the
relative strength of promoters end up with a significantly larger financial system than those
countries where trade liberalization favors those who oppose financial development. he
difference in financial development, measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP, between
these two groups of countries increases by 18 percentage points.”13 This shows that countries
which rely heavily on their own economic situations before entering into the global economy
will stand an immeasurably better chance of succeeding than those who oppose this prior
financial development. In order to ensure that trade liberalization will be successful, one must

12
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be sure that each and every one of these preconditions should be put into place. Stable
financial institutions are large prerequisites for success in the global economic forum, as they
help to ensure that the fiscal policy of the country is as pointed as possible, so that the country
possesses some type of leverage which they can then use to make sure that they are benefiting
from trade negotiations with other nations.
Joseph Stiglitz could not agree more about the necessity of institutional control as a
prerequisite for trade liberalization, as countries must have a very strong foundation in order to
be effective players in the world economy. Only when these strong institutional foundations are
coupled with a slow pace of trade liberalization will a country be successful in their aspirations
to become part of the global economic system. He writes of this idea in his book, saying:
“Managing change is extraordinarily difficult. It is clear that rushing into major reforms
does not work. Shock therapy failed in Russia. China’s Great Leap Forward in the 1960s was a
catastrophe. What matters, of course, is not just the pace of change but the sequencing of
reforms. Privatization was done in Russia before adequate systems of collecting taxes and
regulating newly privatized enterprises were put in place. Liberalizing the free flow of foreign
exchange before the banking system was strengthened turned out to be a disaster in Indonesia
and Thailand. Educating people but not having jobs for them is a recipe for disaffection and
instability, not for growth… Many of the development strategies that were not well
implemented failed because they were based on a flawed vision of development. Successful
countries have a broader vision of what development entails and a more comprehensive
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strategy for bringing it about. Sensitive to concerns such as those just described, they were
better at implementing change.”14
There are many ways in which the implementation of trade liberalization must vary
within countries which are facing different situations. Allegret, Courbis and Dulbecco continue
to discuss the idea of the necessity of strong financial institutions, and the challenges which
emerging markets may face. They write, “The situation is very different in emerging economies
and markets. On the one hand, institutions of market economies are by definition relatively
undeveloped. On the other hand, and more importantly, the financial system in many emerging
markets resulted from policies implemented by political authorities. That means that in these
economies financial practices developed in a less spontaneous way than in mature markets.
Thus any financial reform is rarely a process of incremental institutional change but always a
process of radical change. This characteristic is accentuated by the fact that recent financial
liberalization is largely in response to external pressures.”15 This is an extremely important
point to take into consideration, as emerging economies may be ones in which the political and
economic situation may have changed overnight. Policymakers must be extremely sensitive to
this issue, which is why a much slower pace of trade liberalization is recommended in order to
ensure stability within the state, so that these prerequisites are able to be met, rather than
prescribing to rapid trade liberalization.

14

Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, NY. 2007. P. 54.
Allegret, J.P., B. Courbis and Ph. Dulbecco. “Financial Liberalization and Stability of the Financial System in
Emerging Markets: The Institutional Dimension of Financial Crises.” Review of International Political Economy, Vol.
10, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 73-92. Taylor & Francis, Ltd., JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177451>
15

Hanshaw

19

Evidence of the strengthening of financial institutions as a prerequisite for opening up
an economy can be seen through numerous examples. An important point which Allegret,
Courbis and Dulbecco bring up is the prevalence of external pressures on the decisions of
countries when it comes to trade liberalization. Developed countries, pushing practices like the
Washington Consensus, only take into account their self-interest in many respects, and may
thus undermine the ability of a developing country to develop a strong foundation before
entering into the global economic arena. Jiandong Ju, Yi Wu and Li Zeng16 also discuss the
effects which come with trade liberalization, except they focus on its effect on overall trade
balance. Although their findings are inconclusive, they determine that there is not strong
enough evidence to suggest that trade liberalization alone has a negative effect on overall trade
balance. This implies, however, that many other factors must come into play when determining
whether or not trade liberalization is effective within an economy, such as institutional control
and pace at which the liberalization takes place.
Issues and problems with trade liberalization have been at the forefront of political
discussion for decades. In many senses, although policies such as the Washington Consensus
are the compiled theory of economists and bureaucrats, the support for policies of trade
liberalization back at home continues justifies their use. In their article, “Explaining Citizen
Support for Trade Liberalization,” Karl Kaltenthaler, Ronald Gelleny and Stephen Ceccoli discuss
the support which comes from the citizen populace in terms of policies of trade liberalization.
In their discussion, they write, “Given this considerable debate [including protest movements
16
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during World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings], it is readily apparent that public opinion is a
critical factor in the trade liberalization process. It has been shown in the U.S. and other
advanced industrialized democracies that public opinion is, at the least, a constraint, if not a
determinant of foreign policy decisions.”17 They state that public opinion is motivated by both
political and economic interests, much like the case which was discussed prior in terms of the
motivation of nations to pursue such policies. The basic underlying factor for the willingness of
the public to act as a part of global integration is self-interest. In the case of trade liberalization,
the motivating factor which comes into play most obviously is a concerted economic interest.
The authors of this article write, “Proponents of trade liberalization argue that the integration
of the world's economic markets encourages economic growth and efficiency. Opening
domestic markets to trade and capital flows establishes powerful and direct ties between
national economies and the international system.”12 This is obviously a benefit to those
countries in which trade liberalization is done in the correct manner, but when policies such as
shock therapy are used in order to speed up the process, the result for the developed countries
can be increased cash flows in the short-term, but the destruction of the economies of the
developing countries in the long-term. A concerted effort must be made to show both the
citizens and leaders of the developed nations that both economic and institutional integrity
within the developing countries must be a prerequisite for any adoption of policies of trade
liberalization, and entrance into the global economic forum.
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Many who discuss the idea of trade liberalization know that each country cannot gain its
benefits equally, but that the overall benefit to the global economy must be in the forefront of
any decisions which are made concerning it. Carl Davidson and Steven Matsuz discuss this very
idea within their article, “Trade Liberalization and Compensation,” saying that given the
realization that some countries will be better off than others due to trade liberalization, it only
makes sense to create a system which works to compensate those who ultimately lose. They
write, “Two of the most generally accepted propositions in economics are that trade
liberalization harms some groups but that it also generates aggregate net benefits. In fact,
there are large literatures devoted to identifying the winners and losers from freer trade and
measuring their gains and losses. Yet, there has been surprisingly little research aimed at
investigating the best way to go about compensating those who lose.”18 This shows that the
effort to maximize the benefits of global trade within the already developed countries of the
world is a calculated risk, and that efforts which may be made to ensure the inclusion of
developing countries may work against the interest of the developed nations. This is an
extremely interesting concept, as it seems that the purpose of Washington Consensus policies
is not to create economic equality, but to minimize the risks and losses which developing
countries take. However, if such compensation policies were taken into account, the developed
nations may be able to provide a much more equal footing in the economic global playing-field,
allowing for the dangers of trade liberalization to be minimized.
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Although the pace at which countries should enact trade liberalization policies is quite
obvious from historic example, the extent to which liberalization should occur is still rather
unclear. Xianming Li discusses this very idea in his study, “Liberalization and Real Exchange Rate
Movement.” They examined the extent to which financial liberalization of a country affects its
real exchange rate. Their findings were quite interesting: “Two key findings emerge from the
study. First, controlling for country-specific factors-such as deviation of the real exchange rate
from its long-run equilibrium, relative gross domestic product (GDP) growth, terms of trade, the
share of government expenditure in GDP, and net capital inflows-the real exchange rate
depreciates after a country's most recent episode of trade liberalization. Second, in countries
with multiple liberalization episodes, no significant changes in the real exchange rate were
found at the start of trade liberalization in early episodes, suggesting that partial or transitory
trade liberalizations slow down the adjustment of the real exchange rate toward its equilibrium
level.”19 Basically, the idea behind their findings is the idea which was discussed prior, that not
every country can accrue the benefits of market liberalization, that it has a sort of equilibrium
to which trends converge. In order to ensure that trade liberalization is most effective, these
rises and falls must be as close to the equilibrium as possible.
There are many dangers of trade liberalization which must be considered before a
developing country proposes to jump into the fray of the global economy. As we have seen
throughout history, the policies of shock therapy and the Washington Consensus simply do not
work as proposed. From Latin America and countries in transition, to African nations which are
19
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just beginning to consider trade liberalization, and opening their borders, these policies have
shown time and time again that they simply do not create sustainable growth. On the other
hand, however, we have seen numerous success stories come out of countries which tweak
these policies, and focus on much stronger development within the nation, while slowly
liberalizing their trade regime. Countries such as India, China and Vietnam have shown that this
policy is the one which should be followed. Having the creation of stable financial institutions
and an accountable government as prerequisites for launching into trade liberalization is an
idea which many have proposed, and may be the strongest argument out there. Regardless, we
know that the unsustainable trade liberalization policies of the Washington Consensus simply
do not work with developing nations, many of which have none of the prerequisites which
would make them viable in a global economic system. It must be realized that trade
liberalization is not something which simply happens overnight, and that it should not be
expected to be that way, lest it end in disaster.
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